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The colonial period saw the appearance of two types
of divisions in Indian society. The first was a division
between those who made the world they inhabited
intelligible in terms of modernist discourse and those
who did not. This division ran decisively between the
Indian elite and the lower orders. On top of it,
however, nationalism put in place a second political
division between colonialism and the Indian nation. I
consider Gandhi's discourse or rather his discursive
position to be of crucial importance. This is not
because he created a discourse of inexhaustible
originality, as some argue. But his kind of discourse
managed to bridge the gulf between the lower orders
and the elite and to keep the values, objectives and
conceptions of the world of the two sides intelligible to
each other.
The Indian national movement did not produce an
inevitable Nehruvian result. The way in which Nehru
was able to shape the ideals of the Indian state after
independence was partly a result of some fortuitous
circumstances. No logic of the previous movements,
no wave made it necessary for the Nehruvian elite to
come to power, but there was something deeper which
went in favour of this modernist dominance at the time
of independence. He enjoyed a silent but subtle and
massively significant cultural approval of the modern
elite. Members of this class, dispersed thinly but
crucially throughout the governmental and modern
sectors, approved spontaneously the assumption of
power by a rationalist 'philosopher king' - though
some of them knew that he might incline towards a
statist radicalism common in the forties and fifties.
However, this did not represent a serious discontinuity
at the level of discourse. Entrepreneurial groups and
politicians favouring the propertied classes knew that
they would have differences with Nehru, on socialism,
the state sector, redistribution, foreign policy, land
reforms, the state's power to take away property, etc.
But these were comprehensible differences, differences
of political ideology among those who inhabited the
same social discourse. Political disagreement is of
course a form of successful communication.
A paradox of mobilisation made this early period of
political construction in India relatively easy. If the
divergent types of political discourse, with what they
considered to be politically rational, their incommen-
surable ideals, had simultaneously found utterance in
Indian political life, it might have been exceedingly
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difficult to carry on institutional formation. But the
backwash of mobilisation of the national movement
ensured an implicit trust of the masses in the initiatives
of their leaders. Thus these various conflicting
discourses were not brought immediately into
dialogue on equal terms. During the nationalist
struggle there had occasionally been distinct initiatives
from the lower orders, when political space was
opened up within the national movement. But recent
historical research has also shown how quickly the
main Congress leadership was able to shut off such
space, or bring their movements under control. Thus
the support that the Congress leadership received was
not of the kind that the bourgeoisie in classical
bourgeois revolutions of the west created for
themselves, by reconstituting through a process of
prior cultural movement a hegemony and directive
preeminence for themselves. Ordinary people were
mobilised in the Indian national movement in
tremendous numbers, but not by creating hegemony
of this kind. At the same time, as the failure of the
communist moves towards insurgency indicated, the
subaltern groups were not ready to break with the
bourgeois nationalist leadership, or prepared to take
large world-constructing actions on their own.
This had several consequences. First, of course, the
setting up of political institutions passed off relatively
peacefully; the Constituent Assembly, though strangely
unrepresentative, still represented a sufficient con-
sensus of the organised groups to bring off a
constitution which was not seriously contested. At the
same time, internal realignments within the Congress
led to serious political decisions. The systematic
exodus of the socialist left from the Congress
weakened Nehru considerably inside the party that he
formally commanded, but the death of Patel also left
his own personal eminence uncontested. He was
therefore free to pursue a set of policies for which his
party colleagues would not have been wholly
enthusiastic. The construction he placed on secularism
for instance was clearly resented by a section of
Congress leaders. His drive for redistributive policies
of land reforms met with serious, if undeclared
hostility from his own party's lower level leadership.
Most Congress leaders would have been more
lukewarm than Nehru in developing friendly relations
with the Soviet Union, and would not have
understood in a clear theoretical form the logic of the
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massive heavy industrialisation drive that he pursued
through the second five year plan. This shows in a
sense a miraculous contingency of some of the central
segments of the fairly impressive institutional
structure that Congress under Nehru built up. But
precisely because of his relative isolation within his
own party, Nehru undertook another initiative which
has seemed over the long run to overshadow other
parts of his institutional strategy.
Nehru began to create an alternative apparatus in the
bureaucracy. Planning on a large scale, from 1956
onwards, made for a great extension of an economic
bureaucracy inside the government. As the rhetoric of
social justice and redistribution increased, this
bureaucracy expanded rapidly. This differed from
classical European bourgeois revolutions, where
capitalism first emerged in initiatives and in
institutions within civil society, and the state was later
used as an instrument to correct its spontaneous
production of inequality. In India, there was no
developed civil society and many of capitalism's
classical initiatives within civil society were undertaken
by the state.' The most serious consequence of this of
course was that the state became omnipresent, since it
was performing functions left to the institutions of
civil society, and it was impossible to abjure
transactions with this state. At the same time, it could
only work through the techniques of an unrecon-
structed colonialist bureaucratic style, wholly mono-
logical, criminally wasteful, utterly irresponsible and
unresponsive to public sensitivity. Those after power
would want to get into its seats, completely screened as
they appeared to be from accountability, and those
who could not get into them would become
increasingly alienated.
The manner and structure of capitalist growth
accentuated such differences. Instead of reducing
regional inequalities, capitalism intensified them and
tended to concentrate opportunities and resources in
centres of political power. The cultural consequences
of this process have not been analysed carefully until
recently. Over the long term, the strategy of
development in India, precisely through its relative
successes, has tended to reopen the deep division of
discourse in Indian society, between a homogenising
elite speaking English, the esperanto of the upper
orders, and a vast lower order population looking and
speaking with an intense vernacular hostility against
some of the consequences of this form of capitalist
development.
The Nature of Indian Nationalism
From this point of view it appears justified to say with
Rajni Kothari2 that the first phase of Indian politics
I have advanced an argument of this kind in 'A Critique of the
Passive Revolution', Economic and Political Weekly, Annual
Number, (March, 1989).
2 R. Kothari, Political in India (Boston, 1970).
was built on a kind of consensus, but he seems to have
misjudged the nature of the consensus he identified,
and its possibilities. It was of course an elite consensus,
which passed uncontested because of its nearness to
the mobilisation of the national movement, and the
relation of implicit trust between its leadership and the
masses. It was a consensus of discourse, rather than of
ideological positions. The institutional pattern that
Nehru wished to put in place came up against serious
ideological criticism from the left, especially the
socialists and the communists. But there was still a
commonality at a different level: they had very
different things to say about the political world, its
structure, purposes, ideals, but they shared a common
way of arguing about these things. This seemed to
create réai divisions among them, which was what they
primarily saw. But this also created underlying unities
among them when looked at from outside this
discourse, which is what must have impressed the
other classes and groups in Indian society. The
constitutional frame that was adopted, though it was
exhaustingly detailed (and therefore a lawyers'
constitution rather than a citizens'), still was silent and
vague on various questions. And although the
ideological conflicts in the Constituent Assembly went
in favour of a more conservative reading of the
Congress programme, the Nehru regime took
significant steps immediately afterwards to counteract
this in actual policy. The Planning Commission, soon
to become the actual centre of economic policy
making, remained outside the formal constitutional
framework. Initially, the federal structure worked
through the federalism inside the Congress Party
rather than constitutional channels. The regime of
rights centred on the individual subject, made legal
concessions to minority rights which could be enjoyed
only as members of communities, rather than as
bourgeois individuals. But despite tbese underlying
problems which took some time to break out into the
open, the achievements of the Nehru regime were
massive by any standards. True, some of this was
fortuitous, and caused by the fortunate over-
determination at the time of freedom. But one can
clearly see that given a slightly different turn of events,
India could have had a very different set of
foundational policies, and these most likely would
have been more retrograde.
It was in the economic sphere that Nehru's policies
have enjoyed the greatest long term success, though at
the start his government seemed often on the point of
being overwhelmed by financial and resource
difficulties. By the time he became prime minister,
Nehru had moved away from his 'scientific socialist'
beliefs, though importantly he would still have
characterised his beliefs as scientific. From his point of
view, he moved away from that doctrine because it was
not scientific. He had given up that construction of
socialism, but he had not given up science. Still, his
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commitment to a British Labour version of social
democracy made him interfere with what others would
have considered the more 'natural' course of capitalist
growth. Indeed, Nehru's certainties were shaped by
and shared with the emerging discourses of social
theory, soon to be inscribed on the whole world in the
form of reformist Keynesian economism in all sectors
of public policy. The economic growth of society was
predicated on the building of the industrial sector. In
this, heavy capital goods industries took precedence
and since these could not be built by private capital,
this led to the steady growth of a large public sector
with strong links to ministerial bureaucracies.3 In this
milieu, it was subtly misleading to speak in the
language of the interventionist state, and to transfer,
implicitly, a whole set of expectations from the
European case because that was a language on which
the history of European capitalism was inscribed quite
clearly. In Europe, the state did 'intervene' in a society
whose basic structures had been formed earlier by civil
society, and the existence of a strong civil society made
the state act in responsible ways. In India, where there
was no prior civil society, one could hardly talk of an
interventionist state since many of those institutions
were brought into existence by the state. Therefore, in
a subtle but significant way, the direction of the
descriptive language and justificatory rhetoric was
wrong.
Some of the problems of this kind of economic
planning have long been noted. Even economists who
favour the state sector and its leading role agree that
the planning models probably neglected the question
of agriculture. Not surprisingly, the Nehru regime
faced both economic and political difficulties arising
out of food shortages during the late fifties. The
theoretical fault in all this was that the regime worked,
along with all others thinking about development at
the time, irrespective of ideological positions, with a
heavily reductive economistic theory of social change.
Economic arguments tended to be aggressively
ahistorical. Everything else was turned into problems
to which economic policies had the solutions. The
sequence in which the sectors had emerged, their
specific institutional forms, how the historical
sequence of their emergence could have affected their
institutional logic - such questions were seldom
asked. There is a minor irony in this since much of this
discussion was analysed by Marxism, and Marxism in
its classical form at least is deeply sensitive to
sequences and trajectories.
Second, the bureaucratisation of social life, in the
absence of the structures of civil society, created
difficulties. But the effects of these politics on the
discursive map of Indian society were interesting, and
have not been carefully analysed. The structure of
For a detailed historical argument, rich in empirical detail,
F. Franke!, lndia't Political Economy (Princeton, 1977).
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Nehruvian democracy was raised on an anomalous
base. It did represent, as some of its admirers put it, the
greatest experiment with democracy in the history of
the world, but that was possible partly because the
large masses on whom these rights were conferred
found them too unfamiliar at first for immediate use.
Planning was aimed not only at the construction of a
wide industrial base, but also at reduction of some of
the gross inequalities in incomes. Nehru certainly saw
an alleviation of poverty as a condition for genuine
democracy, but it depended increasingly on the
monologic instruments of the state and its bureaucracy
rather than dialogical, movement-like forms. The
falling apart of the Gandhian language in Indian
politics, which had reduced for a time the hostile
unfamiliarity between elite and subaltern political
semiotics, contributed to this widening gap,
accentuating the divergence between populist govern-
ment policies and popular consciousness. And the
discourse of the elite tended to turn increasingly
inwards in two senses. First, the debates were directed
at the intelligibility and justifiability in terms of the
political stances of the high discourse, leaving the task
of formation of a vernacular, popular discourse
around these questions to an unmindful educational
policy. Second, there was a further teñdency in later
years to withdraw issues of development from public
arenas of discussion and to surrender it to so-called
expert groups, creating a sort of elite confidentiality
around the vital decisions about politics and society.
It must be acknowledged that Nehru personally was
conscious of this withdrawal, and sought to continue
to publicise the development debate. But it was not a
matter so much of personal predilections of leaders,
but a tendency of the structure of development
strategy. Indian democracy remained vibrant, with
occasional mass movements being able to register
their demands on the state, as with the regional
autonomy movements of the fifties, and the food
movements some years later. So the enormous
extension of the state was not coercive, but remained
external. The elite around Nehru were sensitive about
retaining democratic forms and pursuing, within what
they considered to be reasonable limits, the reformist
aspirations of the state. But they did not see the
problem of its externality. In retrospect, its basic
failure seems to have been the almost total neglect of
the question of the cultural reproduction of society. It
did not try deliberately to create or reconstitute
popular commonsense about the political world,
taking the new conceptual vocabulary of rights,
institutions, impersonal power into the vernacular
everyday discourses of rural or small town Indian
society.
Thus, unnoticed by the bustling technocracy of the
modern sector, the transient links across the political
and discursive divide tended to give way. The
independent Indian state followed a programme of
modernity which did not seek to be grounded in the
political vocabulary of the nation, or at least its major
part. As a result, precisely those ideals - of a modern
nationalism, industrial modernity, secular state,
democracy and minority rights - came in the long run
to appear not as institutions won by a common
national movement, but as ideals intelligible to and
pursued by the modern elite which inherited power
from the British. More than that: subtle and
interesting things began to happen to this logic of
'modernisation' which have gone unnoticed. Precisely
because the state continued to expand, precisely
because it went in a frenetic search of alibis to control
ever larger areas of social life, it had to find its
personnel, especially at lower levels, from groups who
did not inhabit the modernist discourse. Thus it is
wrong to believe that the Indian state or its massive
bureaucracy is a huge Weberian organisation binding
the relaxed, fuzzy, slow-moving society in an iron
structure. What has actually been happening is more
complex. By overstretching, the state has been forced
to recruit personnel from the groups who speak and
interpret the world in terms of the other discourse.
Since major government policies have their final point
of implementation very low down in the bureaucracy,
they are reinterpreted beyond recognition.
As a result of its uncontrolled growth, the policies of
the state have also lost some of their cohesion. If one
does not have a purely romantic view of the Indian
past, one can see the direction this reinterpretation of
government policies, this utilisation of internal space
for lower level initiative would take. It is not surprising
that arguments of social justice are often used as an
unanswered justification for the encouragement of
nepotism and corruption. Indeed, there is very little
corruption in India that is not done for high moral
principles. The actual conduct of those in authority
has also tended in recent years to slide backwards
towards a more historically familiar' style of
irresponsible power, with the withdrawal of significant
decisions, under various excuses, from the arenas of
public criticism and responsibility. It must be seen,
while debating the effects and justification of
modernity, that these trends come straight out of
India's glorious past.
However, the point here is not to tell the story of
Indian politics, or to present a convincing periodi-
sation. In the accepted ways of standard social science
the story has been told many times over. Indeed, my
point is that despite those familiar narratives of the
achievements and failures of Indian democratic
institutions, there is another story to be told. This
seems to be sketchily glimpsed by recent observers of
Indian politics, but no one seems to know what the
story is about. I am quite clear that this ambiguity is
reflected in the curious way I have just presented the
problem. I think it can be sorted out in a preliminary
way by using the distinction between political ideology
and structures of discourse, and acknowledging that
the classifications that can be produced by their
different criteria look quite different. I should like to
look at some of these diagnoses of the recent problems
of the Indian state, and move our discussion towards
some theoretical conclusions.
Political Diagnoses
One of the punctuations generally observed in Indian
politics is the spectacular difference between the
Nehru period, which ended in 1964, and the later one. I
have argued elsewhere that there is a further division:
the electoral instability of governments in the period
after the fourth general elections in 1967 has since been
changed into a more serious and frightening
uncertainty about the state form itself. On the one side
the political behaviour of party leaders and managers
seem to discredit the institutions of democracy; on the
other, sometimes popular anger against such political
games has assumed a form in which it seems that it
might pass into a vote of no confidence on the state
form itself.
What has been the historical record of this complex of
institutions? This question has been discussed so often
that there are only some of its implications which need
to be assessed. But we must also keep in view the
standard and fairly reasonable defence by Nehru's
followers (in ideas, not in party affiliation: indeed, the
Congress Party under later leaders has been the main
destroyer of the institutional logic that Nehru sought
to make safe) that forty years is too short a span for
institutions to take root or to adapt themselves to a
very different historical milieu. But even in the short
term, its achievements are not negligible. Unlike in
most other Third World states, a formal democratic
constitution was not initially adopted to be dropped
soon after in favour of dictatorial authority. In fact,
the way the emergency ended in India showed the
great ideological depth of the democratic idea. Mrs
Gandhi believed that even the record of the emergency
regime had to be electorally justified. Often, however,
other achievements of the Nehruvian model are
clouded in a discussion either of pure economic
growth, in which dictatorial regimes accepting
subordinate productive roles in the international
capitalist system are shown to be remarkably superior
to India's record in growth rates, or of radical theories
based on strategic ignorance, which show the
distributive advantages of a communist economy. But
industrialisation in India, though wasteful in many
ways, has a wide base. And the institutional form of
the economy has ensured that its political sovereignty
has not been renegotiated through extreme economic
pressure. All these relative achievements are
undeniable, but this shows the present predicament of
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the Indian state in a curious light. For the state is not
threatened by forces from outside. On the contrary,
most powers acknowledge its resilience and regional
dominance. But it appears threatened from inside. Its
difficulties arise not because its performance was bad,
but rather from what its rulers would no doubt
consider among its modest achievements. And most
remarkably, the institutional forms that the early
nationalist leadership created for the benefit and well
being of the common people seems to have come
under pressure as more common people have entered
into party politics.
This then is the basic form of the paradox of
democracy in India. It is undoubtedly true that some
of Indira Gandhi's electoral moves, and the rhetoric
consistently used by all political parties - of popular
participation, realisation of rights, eradication of
poverty - have led to a greater political articulateness
of the ordinary people. To that extent, high politics,
even in the spectacular arenas, which were earlier
preserves of the modernist elite are coming under
pressure from the alphabet of the lower discourse. It
seems, however, that the more ordinary people have
written their minds into the format of politics, the
greater the pressure or threat on democratic structures
as generally understood in terms of western
precedents. There seems to be some incompatibility
between the institutional logic of democratic forms
and the logic of popular mobilisation. The more one
part of the democratic ideal is realised the more the
other part is undermined. The paradox, as T. N. Madan
recently4 put it is that if Indian politics become
genuinely democratic in the sense of coming into line
with what the majority of ordinary Indians would
consider reasonable, they will become less democratic
in the sense of conforming to the principles of a
secular, democratic state acceptable to the early
nationalist elite. What seems to have begun in Indian
politics is a conflict over intelligibility, a writing of the
political world that is more fundamental than
traditional ideological disputes. It appears that the
difference between the two discourses is reappearing,
now that the lower discourse is asserting itself and
making itself heard precisely through the opportunities
created by the upper one. The way it rewrites the
political world might not be liked by the ruling
modernist elites, but it is too late to disenfranchise
them.
This is an interesting and challenging line of thought,
and very different from earlier diagnoses of political
difficulties in India. Earlier, social scientists usually
began by expressing solidarity with the project of
introducing modernity, equating the modernity with a
re-enactment of the European drama. (Indeed, there
was no Asian drama to stage at all. What occurred in
T. N. Madan, 'Secularism in its Place', Journal of Asian Studies
(November, 1987).
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India was merely the Asian premier of the European
narrative, luckily with an appropriately cultivated
cast). They expressed irritation or puzzlement at the
obduracy with which society seemed to resist it, and
such resistance was generally accounted for through
some simple, malignant form of direct political agency
- corruption, lack of political will, etc. The
explanation that I am proposing seeks a less agency-
oriented answer to the difficulties, and is prepared to
be puzzled by deeper questions, and is ready to turn
the questions around towards social science itself.
From this perspective, the equation is to be arranged
not between a rational programme prepared by the
elite and carried out by an instrumentally viewed state
on the one hand, and a resisting, irrational society, but
the other way around. Indian politicians of the Nehru
type made a mistake very similar to the one that has
now been, a trifle theatrically, traced through the
entire history of social science. Western social theory
moved from a sort of high orientalism practised by
Marx and Weber to a very inadequate theory of
modernisation worked out by Parsonian develop-
mentalists, a move often celebrated as from philosophy
to science, but in reality from tragedy to farce.
Nothing is more disorienting than when our
fundamental taxonomies are turned around and we
blink at a world in which things occupy entirely
unaccustomed places. This argument tries something
like this about development thinking in India. Clearly,
many Indian social scientists carried on their earlier
debates within a world which was firmly held by the
solid homogenising taxonomies established by
nationalist beliefs. Most political argument was
internal to these boundaries. The emergence of such
arguments in serious social theory shows that the
pervasiveness, the self evidentiality of the nationalist
construction of the world is gradually fraying and
disappearing. It has been argued forcefully in recent
years, by social scientists like Chatterjee, Nandy and
Madan,5 that the state and the ruling elite uncritically
adopted an orientalist, externalist construction of
their society and its destiny reflected in the wonderful
and tragic symbolism of 'the discovery of India'. Its
initiatives were bound to be onesided. To the world of
India's lower orders, it simply refused or merely forgot
to explain itself. Indeed, to some it would have seemed
that the Indian elite was more concerned about
justifying its initiatives to external audiences than it its
own. Historically, its absentmindedness about cultural
unity has driven apart the political diaglossia of the
national movement, held together in a sense by the
easy bilingualism of its political leaders and cultural
intelligentsia. Today, that cultural terrain is increas-
ingly broken into a unilingual English speaking elite,
and an equally monolingual conglomerate of regional
P. Chattcrjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial Ww/d: A
Derivative Discourse? (Delhi, 1986); Madan, ibid.; and A. Nandy.
The Intimate Enemy (Delhi. 1986).
groups which are losing a dialogical relation not only
with the upper strata but between languages as well,
leading to greater friction and hostility among regions.
The implications of this critique must be seen clearly.
It has brought into question the cognitive, the political
and the moral legitimacy of the whole institutional
regime constructed after independence. About the
whole lot - the impersonal nature of public power,
the rule of law, the democratic order, the idea of a
complex and composite nation, a secular polity - it
asks whether it is legitimate for a relatively small elite
to impose their ideals on others who do not necessarily
share them. It also asks if this political form, because
of its unintelligibility, can be worked by these people.
It must be seen that it moves to cognitive questions to
radicalise its critique. It must also be clear that these
questions are addressed not only to the Indian
political or modernist ruling elite, but also to social
theory in equal measure - because they can be
logically so directed, and also because it is these
theories, which the elite believed, that gave them the
intellectual justification to do what they had
undertaken.
But some of the more general, abstract, epistemic
implications of this kind of argument should be noted.
In a sense, this sort of theoretical discomfort tries to
break from the vulgar pretensions of being a policy
science (which posited too direct a relation between
social science and government policy) and seeks to
return to a more classical conception of political
theory, as a kind of historical self-reflection of society.
It assumes that one of the tests of good social theory is
whether it can relevantly comment on what is
happening in society, and contribute to general
management of social destiny. It rules out a
distancing, reflective attitude to social and political
questions. Its own performance must be as subject to
this criterion of success as that of the previous theory
that it rejects.
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